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EIGHTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE APPLIES TO STATES
THROUGH FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
4264 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165)
In Hunt v. Roth I the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
1. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-
2165). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
with instructions to dismiss, finding the issue moot at the time of the court of appeals decision. Id
at 4265. The mootness limitations inherent in bail result in few cases reaching the Supreme Court.
See Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L. J. 1140 (1972); Note, Compelling
Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954).
In theory, a decision vacating a judgment deprives the opinion of precedential effect, leaving the
Supreme Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. See O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975); United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950). In prac-
tice, however, the effect is not quite as dramatic. A vacated decision retains limited precedential
value because it establishes the position and reasoning of the Court on the issue.
This distinction between theory and practice is found in two analogous situations: the meaning
of a denial of certiorari and the significance of summary disposition of appeals to the Supreme
Court. In theory, a denial of certiorari is not an indication of the Court's position on the merits.
United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1613 (2d
edo 1973); 16 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, E. CHOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 4004, at 510 (1977). In practice, however, a denial of certiorari does indicate the
Court's approval of the decision below. Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1227 (1979). Similarly, in theory, summary disposition of an appeal to the Supreme Court is
disposition on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Ohio exrel. Eaton v. Price,
360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959). In practice, it is questionable whether the merits are reached on disposi-
tion. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979);
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Linzer, supra at 1291-99; Note, The Precedential
Effect of Summary Affirmance and Dismissalsfor Want of a Substantial Federal Question by the
Supreme Court after Hicks v. Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REV. 117passim (1978).
In theory, the court of appeals decision in Hunt v. Roth has no precedential value. In practice,
the opinion has limited precedential value. A defendant denied bail in the future due to the
Nebraska constitutional provision could use the opinion to expedite an appeal to the Supreme
Court. He could bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979), as Hunt did, with the reasonable
expectation that the district court would adhere to Hunt v. Roth and declare the Nebraska provi-
sion unconstitutional. On appeal, the same panel or a different panel of the court of appeals
would almost certainly arrive at the same conclusion. In this manner, the entire appeal process
would be expedited placing the issue before the Supreme Court before it is rendered moot.
A finding of mootness could also be avoided if the defendant brings an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1979), seeking money damages. The difficulty with this option is finding a party not ex-
empt by sovereign immunity. See generally Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980); Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Rzzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
A defendant denied bail because of the Nebraska provision could also avoid a finding of moot-
ness by bringing a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) on behalf of all pretrial detainees
similarly situated.
Washington University Open Scholarship
646 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:645
Circuit revived the incorporation' doctrine by expressly holding the
eighth amendment bail provision applicable to the states.
The charges against Hunt included forcible sexual offenses and non-
sexual offenses.4  The Nebraska Constitution provided that persons
charged upon substantial evidence with a forcible sex offense had no
right to bail.' The municipal court therefore denied Hunt's application
for bail on the forcible sex offenses, and the state district court af-
firmed.6  Hunt filed a federal complaint seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief from the denial of bail.7 The district court dismissed the
complaint and upheld the Nebraska constitutional provision." The
Eighth Circuit, becoming one of the first courts expressly to incorporate
the excessive bail clause into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,9 reversed 0 and held: Denial of bail by the Nebraska
2. "Incorporation" as used in this Comment refers to the process of making specific provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Some scholars have criticized this use of the term "incorporation." See, e.g., Hen-
kin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77 (1963).
3. "Excessive bail shall not be required. . . .' U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. The state had charged Hunt with: (1) first degree sexual assualt on a child, (2) three
counts of first degree forcible sexual assault, (3) several counts of non-sexual felonies, and (4) one
count of nonforcible sexual assault. 648 F.2d at 1151. The Omaha Municipal Court allowed
Hunt bail on the non-sexual offenses but denied him bail on the sexual offenses.
5. "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for treason, sexual offenses
involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim, and murder, where the proof is
evident or the presumption great." NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
Before 1978, only treason and murder were nonbailable when the proof was evident or the
presumption great. In 1978, the Nebraska legislature amended the state's Constitution to its pres-
ent form.
6. On May 23, 1980 Hunt appeared in Douglas County District Court for a review of the
denial of bail. For the purposes of those proceedings, Hunt stipulated that the proof was evident
or the presumption great. 648 F.2d at 1151.
7. Hunt's action was filed under the" Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
8. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165). Hunt also fied an unsuccessful petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id.
The district court relied on the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb.
850, 278 N.W.2d 106, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 920 (1979), in dismissing Hunt's § 1983 action. See
648 F.2d at 1151. The facts in Parker were similar to those in Hunt. The Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected Parker's argument, that Article I, § 9 of the Nebraska Constitution violated the
excessive bail prohibition of the eighth amendment, id at 860, 278 N.W.2d at 113, despite its
earlier holding in State v. Pilgrim, 182 Neb. 594, 597-98, 156 N.W.2d 171, 173-74 (1968), that the
federal prohibition against excessive bail was applicable to the states. After dismissing all of
Parker's other constitutional arguments, 202 Neb. at 868-69, 278 N.W.2d at 116-17, the Parker
court upheld the constitutionality of Article I, § 9 of the Nebraska Constitution. Id at 871, 278
N.W.2d at 117-18.
9. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of
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Constitution in forcible rape cases violates the eighth amendment."
In 1833, the United States Supreme Court established that the Bill of
Rights' 2 was adopted to limit only the power of the federal government
and was not applicable to the states.' 3 After the Civil War, Congress
sought to limit the power of the states in a similar fashion and proposed
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.' 4 Soon after
those amendments were ratified,' 5 scholars and courts began to debate
the meaning and scope of the fourteenth amendment privileges and
habeas corpus and Hunt's prayer for immediate relief as moot because he subsequently had been
convicted on several counts. 648 F.2d at 1151. The court, however, found that the district court
erred in dismissing Hunt's complaint for declaratory judgment under § 1983, because Hunt's ap-
peal raised a question "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 1152. Because appeals
from three convictions were pending at the time of the decision, id at 1151, the court determined
that under Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the possibility of a new trial after
direct appeal was sufficient to maintain a live controversy and prevent the issue from being ren-
dered moot. 648 F.2d at 1151-52.
The court recognized that if even one of Hunt's convictions was affirmed, the case would be-
come moot because pretrial release on bail would no longer be possible. Id. at 1152 n.5. Judge
Arnold, in dissent, argued that the case should be dismissed because the likelihood of the decision
to be of any use to Hunt was too attenuated and speculative. Id. at 1167 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority opinion and found that the
issue in the case was not "capable of repetition, yet evading review," because no court has held
that "a mere physical or theoretical possibility [is] sufficient." 50 U.S.L.W. 4264, 4265 (U.S. Mar.
2, 1982) (No. 80-2165). Rather, there must be a "'reasonable expectation' or a 'demonstrated
probability' that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party." Id
(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)). The Court agreed with
Judge Arnold that there was no reasonable expectation that all three of Hunt's convictions would
be overturned on appeal. 50 U.S.L.W. 4264, 4265 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165).
Justice White dissented, arguing that the issue was not moot because of the possibility of Hunt
being denied bail pending appeal. Id at 4265-66. The majority dismissed this argument, because
the question of pretrial bail is distinct from bail pending appeal. Id. at 4265 n.5.
10. Id. at 1156. While the primary issue in Hunt concerned the interpretation of the exces-
sive bail clause in relation to the Nebraska Constitution, the significance of the preliminary hold-
mg should not be overlooked. Without incorporating the bail clause of the eighth amendment
mto the liberties protected by the fourteenth, the Eighth Circuit could not have arrived at its
decision. Because principles of federalism require federal courts to defer to state supreme court
interpretations of state constitutional provisions, id. at 1155, it was important that the Eighth Cir-
cuit's opinion not rest on an "assumption" that the excessive bail prohibition is applied to the
states. See notes 78-79 infra. The focus of this Comment is the appropriateness of the incorpora-
tion decision and its implications. The court's application of the excessive bail clause to the Ne-
braska Constitutional provision, see note 5 supra, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
11. 648 F.2d at 1165.
12. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
13. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
15. The amendments were ratified in 1868.
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immunities and due process clauses. 16
Forty years later, in the Slaughter-House Cases,17 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument ihat the privileges and immunities clause was a
short-hand designation for the Bill of Rights. Thereafter, focus shifted
to the due process clause as constitutional authority for applying the
Bill of Rights to the states.' Since then the Court has determined the
scope of the fourteenth amendment due process clause by a "gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion"' 9 of certain rights.20
The Court has had difficulty, however, in deciding which of the first
ten amendments should be incorporated. Three distinct approaches
were suggested by various Justices: fundamental rights-natural law,21
16. The relevant portions of the first section state:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Butcher's Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co. (The Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
18. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 78. See generally J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965).
19. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
20. Specific Bill of Rights guarantees have been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
and made binding on the states on a case-by-case basis. The current scope of incorporation is
outlined below:
First Amendment: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (freedom of speech).
Fourth Amendment: Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (fourth amendment standards identi-
cal for federal and state governments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule).
Ffth Amendment: Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel); Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (self-in-
crimination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination). But see Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (applicability of grand jury clause rejected).
Sixth Amendment: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartial jury); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) (notice of charge).
Seventh 4mendment: Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (right to jury in civil cases not
applicable).
Eighth Amendment: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (cruel and unusual punish-
ment). See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (assumed application of excessive bail
provision).
21. Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Harlan are most closely identified with this approach.
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320 (1937) (majority opinion by Cardozo, J.), overruled,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frank-
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total incorporation,22 and selective incorporation.23
The "fundamental2 4 rights-natural law" approach would allow the
Court flexibility25 in defining fourteenth amendment due process. This
approach would neither limit the possible scope of due process to the
provisions of the Bill of Rights nor require that any or all of the rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments be applied to the states. In-
stead, the Court would incorporate those rights "so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 2 6
funer, J., concurring), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 215 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. Justice Black was the staunchest supporter of this approach. See Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Akin to Justice Black's total incorporation view is the notion of "incorporation plus," suggested
by Justices Murphy and Rutledge in their separate Adamson dissent. Although they indicated
their "substantial agreement" with Justice Black, they stated that they were "not prepared to say
that the [fourteenth amendment] is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights." Id. at
123-24. This approach found at least tacit acceptance in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
1965). In Griswold the Court found that the Bill of Rights encompasses the right of privacy, a
right not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas wrote that "specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
23. Justices Brennan and White championed this approach. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
In addition to the three mentioned theories, a fourth theory has emerged in the civil due process
area. It purports to balance the importance of the right to the individual against the administra-
tive costs that recognition of the right would impose on the government. The theory considers
alternative procedures to ensure the right. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Nowak,
Fore ward-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CIUMINOL-
oGY 397, 401-02 (1979)(determine "whether this society's historic and philosophic commitment to
those values requires it to bear the costs"). See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Pro-
cess Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHa. L. REv. 28 (1976). See also Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Saphire, Specfying Due
Process Values: Towarda More Responsive Approach to Procedural Frotection, 127 U. PA. L. Rv.
111 (1978).
Professor Nowak predicted that the Court will assume an arbitrary quality in criminal proce-
dure decisions if the Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), approach (see notes 40-45 infra and
accompanying text) of applying "ancillary" as well as "core" rights continues. Nowak, supra, at
400-04.
24. The use of "fundamental rights" in defining due process has its origins in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) in which Justice Busbrod Washington
enumerated certain "fundamental rights" protected by the interstate privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
25. See Kadish, supra note 23, at 319; Nowak, supra note 23, at 397; Schaefer, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedaure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1956).
26. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964). In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), the Court, after recognizing that some
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Such rights would be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"2 7 for-
bidding to the states that which is "repugnant to the conscience of
mankind. 28
Justice Black criticized the fundamental rights-natural law ap-
proach29 and advocated3" total incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
31
protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights were a part of "fundamental fairness," stated: "If this
is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they
are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law." Id. at 99.
Accord, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932);
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915);
Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969). See generally Henkin, supra note 2, at 84.
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), overruled, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969). Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping petitioner's stomach to
retrieve two contraband morphine capsules, which were used to convict petitioner, was conduct
shocking to the conscience) with Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood test taken from
unconscious petitioner to determine blood alcohol content not personally offensive).
29. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964): "I think ... the 'natural law' theory of the Constitution. . .degrade[s] the consti-
tutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously appropriate[s] for this Court a broad
power which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise." Id. at 70 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). In the same opinion, Justice Black continued: "To hold that this Court can determine what,
if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the
great design of a written Constitution." Id. at 89. Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155-56 (1959) (Black., J., dissenting);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (Black., J., concurring).
Courts and commentators have attacked Justice Black's approach, contending that total incor-
poration is subject to the same criticism Black leveled at the fundamental rights approach. Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of JAights? The Original Understanding, 2
STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949). Indeed, Justice Harlan argued that the same degree of broad power
that Black said the Court had appropriated was inherent in the role of the judiciary. See Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Henkin, supra note 2, at
82-84; Nowak, supra note 23, at 400.
30. Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in many of his opinions. See, e.g., Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968). Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan indicated that'
they "neither accepted nor rejected that view." Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275
(1960).
31. "My view has been and is that the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole, makes the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 n.l (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original). See H. FLACK, THE ADOPrION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1908), which Justice Black cited in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 n.5 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Contra, Fairman, supra
note 29, at 140; Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 7he
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Although the Court32 rejected total incorporation, most of the Bill of
Rights was subsequently incorporated33 .
In Duncan v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court announced a compro-
mise approach 35-selective incorporation 36-to determine if the ques-
tioned right should be incorporated. 37 This approach basically uses the
fundamental rights-natural law approach,38 yet looks to the Bill of
Rights for guidance in ascertaining the meaning of due process.
3 9
Judiciallnteruretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). See also 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 1158 (1953).
32. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting). See G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 475-76 (10th ed. 1980); note 20 supra.
34. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
35. "The Court's approach to this case is an uneasy and illogical compromise among the
views of various Justices on how the Due Process Clause should be interpreted." Id. at 172
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Although Justice White never referred to this theory as selective incorporation, jurists
have used the term to identify it as such. See Nowak, supra note 23, at 397; Duker, The Right to
Bai. A Historical.Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REv. 33 (1977). Justice Brennan has been the major spokes-
man of the selective incorporation approach. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1960) (equally divided court); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1961).
37. The test is "whether a right is among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,'... ; whether it is a 'fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial.'" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
38. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
39. "In resolving conflicting claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language [of Due
Process], the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance. ... 391 U.S. at
147-48.
Justice White charged that the fundamental rights-natural law approach incorrectly focused on
an "imagined system" to determine which rights are fundamental. Id. at 149-50 n.14. Instead, the
Court should look to those rights fundamental to an "Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."
Id. Justice Harlan criticized the selective incorporation approach as illogical. Id. at 181 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Black expressed willingness to support this doctrine as an acceptable alter-
native to total incorporation. Id. at 211 (Black, J., concurring).
Scholars also criticized the selective incorporation approach. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 77-
78; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 939
(1965).
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court did not restrict itself to those rights listed in the
Bill of Rights in defining the scope of due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Court,
using the Duncan approach, id at 361-64, held that the state was required in a criminal proceeding
to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime. The Court stated:
"The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure
.... The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence--that bedrock
'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administra-
tion of our criminal law."' Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
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The Warren Court extended selective incorporation to encompass
not only specific provisions of the Bill of Rights but also the judicially-
defined details of the federal provisions.40 Thus, in Mapp v. Ohio4' the
Court held that the fourteenth amendment incorporated not only the
search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment42 but also the
exclusionary rule enforcement mechanism 43 that had been applied by
the federal courts since 1949." Critics on the Court argued in response
that this development violated the spirit of federalism and diluted con-
stitutional rights.45
This theory of incorporation is characterized by Gunther as the "having your cake and eating it
too" position. G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 483 n.3.
40. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) ("once it is decided that a particular
Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice'... the same constitu-
tional standards apply against both the State and Federal governments"); Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117, 158 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("only impermissible subjective judgments can ex-
plain stopping short of the incorporation of the full sweep of the specific right being absorbed").
See also 391 U.S. at 161; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 406 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
Under the fundamental rights-natural law approach, a finding that one of the provisions in the
Bill of Rights was applicable to the states did not necessarily mean that all of the ancillary rules
were also applicable. For example, in holding the fourth amendment search and seizure provision
applicable to the states, but not the exclusionary rule (adopted for federal jurisdictions in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)), Justice Frankfurter explained that only the "core" was appli-
cable to the states. The states were then free to apply various solutions. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 31 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Accord, Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Although this approach was first used by the court in Mapp, Justice
Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, earlier expounded the theory in
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.), and again in
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 157 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting), overruled, Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). See generally Henkin, supra note 2, at 74.
42. After the decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), the fourth amend-
ment search and seizure provision became applicable to the states.
43. The exclusionary rule forbids the use of illegally seized evidence because it is "a denial of
the constitutional rights of the accused." Id at 398.
"To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoy-
ment .... [I]t also makes very good sense .... Moreover, as was said in Elkins, 'It]he very
essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and
federal courts.'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-58 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 221 (1960)).
44. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. The internal logic of the selective incorporation doctrine cannot be respected if the
Court is both committed to interpreting faithfully the meaning of the federal Bill of
Rights and recognizing the governmental diversity that exists in this country. The
"backlash" in Williams exposes the malaise, for there the Court dilutes a factual guaran-
tee in order to reconcile the logic of "incorporation" the "jot-for-jot and case-for-case"
application of the federal right to the States, with the reality of federalism.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord, Crist v. Bretz, 437
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The Supreme Court has also used historical analysis to define "due
process"46 by looking to old English law, colonial law, and law at and
immediately following the American Revolution in deciding whether a
right is fundamental.47
Bail had its origins in early England, when "wergeld" a and "bohr"4 9
were initiated to restrain private vengeance until a public trial could be
commenced.50 The Petition of Rights of 1628,51 the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679,52 and the Bill of Rights of 167911 all sought to facilitate
U.S. 28, 40 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 213-14 (Fortas, J., concurring);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23,44 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Contra, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 170 (Black, J., concurring). See
also Friendly, supra note 39, at 953-55, 938; Nowak, supra note 23, at 400-01.
The sharp division on the Court was particularly evident on the issue of whether unanimous
verdicts are a part of the sixth and fourteenth amendment jury right. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). See also
Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1969); Nowak, supra note 23, at 399 n.16.
46. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (8 How.) 272 (1856),
Justice Curtis stated:
[We must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common
and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown
not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on
by them after the settlement of this country.
Id. at 277. See generally Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898); Duker, supra note 36, at
33; Kadish, supra note 23, at 322. See also Fairman, supra note 29; Friendly, supra note 39; Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, (1965); Meyer, Constitutionality
of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1140 (1972); Morrison, supra note 31.
Historical analysis has been conclusive in some cases. See, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1921). Other cases have completely ignored such analysis. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
47. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-61 (1968).
48. "[Tlhe value set upon a man's life and bodily faculties in accordance with his rank in
society, and paid as compensation for injury or death." Duker, supra note 36, at 35.
49. Bohr, initiated in the Laws of Kings Hlothaere (673-685 A.D.) and Eadric (685-687
A.D.), is a form of surety. "[W]hen one person initiated a complaint against the other, the accused
had to give 'surety' to the judicial officer to guarantee the appearance at trial." Id.
50. Id. at 43. All crimes were bailable until the Statute of Westminster in the year 1175,
which was intended to curb the discretionary power of the sheriffs. Id. at 45-46.
51. 3 Charles 1, C. 1 (1628). See Foote, supra note 46, at 966.
52. 31 Charles 2, C. 2 (1679).
[A]fter the Party shall be brought before them the said Lord Chancellor. . .shall dis-
charge the said Prisoner from his Imprisonment, taking his or their Recognizances, with
one or more Surety or Sureties, in any Sum according to their Discretion, having regard
to the Quality of the Prisoner and Nature of the offense, for his or their Appearance in
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pretrial freedom for the accused.54 None, however, endeavored to offer
an unlimited right to bail for all offenses.5
The American colonies continued the tradition of pretrial release for
all legislatively defined bailable offenses. 56 Congress adopted the "ex-
cessive bail" clause57 as part of the Bill of Rights with little comment. 8
The bail clause was supplemented immediately by the first Judiciary
Act, which provided a federal statutory right to bail in all noncapital
cases.59 Since then, each of the fifty states has provided for some form
of bail.6°
In Stack v. Boyle6 1 the Supreme Court interpreted the excessive bail
clause of the eighth amendment.62 The Court held that bail set in an
the Court of the King's Bench... unless it shall appear... that the Party [is]...
committed. . . for such Matter or Offenses for which by law the Prisoner is not bailable.
Id, reprinted in Duker, supra note 36, at 66. See Foote, supra note 46, at 967. See generally E.
DEHAAs, ANTIQUmiES OF BAIL.: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
TO THE YEAR 1275, at 4 (1940).
53. 1 Win. & Mary 2, C. 2 (1689). See Foote, supra note 46, at 966.
54. See Duker, supra note 36, at 33; Foote, supra note 46, at 1120; Meyer, supra note 46, at
1140.
55. See E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 46 (1957); Duker, upra note 36, at 33; Foote,
supra note 46, at 968; Meyer, supra note 46, at 1140.
56. For a thorough discussion of early colonial statutes, see Duker, supra note 36, at 77-83.
57. See note 3 supra.
58. 1 CONG. DEB. 754 (1834). See Duker, supra note 36, at 85-86; Foote, Supra note 46, at
969-71.
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
60. In 42 states, constitutional or statutory provisions make all persons accused of a noncapi-
tal crime bailable by sufficient sureties. Persons accused of a capital crime are bailable when the
proof is evident or the presumption is great. In Texas, "[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident; but this provision shall not be
construed to prevent bail after indictment found upon examination of the evidence, in such man-
ner as may be prescribed by law." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 11. Georgia and New York provide an
absolute right to bail only in misdemeanor cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 29-901 (1977); N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAW § 530.20(1) (McKinney 1971). In three states, the judge has almost complete discre-
tion to allow bail or not, in accord with common law. MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 276, § 42
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); VA. CODE § 19.2-120 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 62-lC-1(a) (1977).
North Carolina requires the trial judge to determine pretrial release in noncapital cases in one of
four categories. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-533, -534 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). In capital cases
the judge has complete discretion. Id § 15A-533(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). In Hawaii, the judge
"may dispense with bail if reasonably satisfied that the defendant. . .will appear when directed,
except for a defendant charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment." HAWAn
CONST. art. I, § 12. See also Duker, supra note 36, at 93 n.373; Mitchell, Bail Reform and the
Constitufionality of Pre-trial Detentions, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1226 n.17, 1227 n.22, 1228 n.24
(1969).
61. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
62. See note 3 supra.
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amount higher than that reasonably calculated to assure the accused's
presence at trial was "excessive" and therefore unconstitutional. 63 The
federal Bail Reform Act of 19666" continued this historical tradition 65
of affording a person accused of a noncapital offense the right to pre-
trial release on bail.66
Persons charged with a crime punishable by death, however, do not
enjoy the same statutory right.6 7 Bail is denied in the federal courts if
the judge believes that release will pose a danger to the community or
that no set of conditions will reasonably assure that a person charged
with a capital offense will not flee.68 Courts have traditionally used this
latter rationale for explaining the denial of bail in capital cases.69 In
the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,7" how-
ever, the underlying gravity of the offense became the justification for
denying bail in some of these cases.7'
Although there is a federal statutory right to bail in noncapital
cases,72 scholars dispute the existence of a similar constitutional right.
73
63. 342 U.S. at 4-5. "Mhe fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant." Id. at 5.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976). Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
analagous to the Bail Reform Act. FED. R. CwM. P. 46.
65. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. The judge presiding over the bail hearing is obligated to use the Stack test insetting the
amount of bail. He may, however, condition the release by requiring one or more of the condi-
tions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1)-(5) (1976). Congress' power to define the class of offenses
not entitled to bail is subject to fifth amendment due process constraints. United States ex rel.
Covington v. Coparo, 297 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
67. Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976) (as amended 1970) (release in capital cases or
after conviction).
68. Id.
69. 4W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296-97. See notes 55-56 & 59 supra and accompa-
nying text.
70. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
71. Furman forbade the imposition of the death penalty if left solely to the unfettered discre-
tion of the jury. Id. at 239.40. Consequently, many state statutes that had authorized capital
punishment were rendered unconstitutional. States that had used the death penalty to distinguish
between bailable and nonbailable offenses were then left to decide whether to grant bail to a
prisoner who stood accused of a previously nonbailable crime. Some state courts used the tradi-
tional justification, see note 69 supra and accompanying text, and held all crimes bailable. See In
re Tarr, 109 Ariz. 264, 508 P.2d 728 (1973); Baumgarner v. State, 253 Ark. 723, 506 S.W.2d 834
(1972); State v. Johnson, 61 NJ. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972); Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa.
325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972). Other courts reasoned that the offenses are not classified on the basis of
penalty, but rather on the gravity or nature of the crime itself. See People v. Obie, 41 Cal. App. 3d
744, 116 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1974); Jones v. Sheriff, Washoe County, 89 Nev. 175, 509 P.2d 824 (1973).
72. See notes 64-66 supra.
73. Duker, supra note 36, at 86, argued that "[ih]istory clearly indicates that the [eighth
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The bail clause74 is unclear, and the Supreme Court's decisions are in-
conclusive. Contradictory dicta in Stack v. Boyle75 and Carlson v. Lan-
don7 6 have produced conflicting lower court decisions on this issue.77
While a constitutional right to bail in noncapital cases is disputed,
there is general agreement that the prohibition against excessive bail
applies to the states.78 The Supreme Court has not conclusively ruled
on the issue. In Schilb v. Kuebel 7 9 however, the Court assumed the
provision to be applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.8 0
amendment bail provision] does no more than prohibit the setting of excessive bail in cases pre-
scribed bailable. The clause is, therefore, not self-executing. It requires the legislation of Con-
gress creating the right to bail to lend it sustenance." Id. (footnotes omitted). Foote, supra note
46, at 969, contended, however, that "[s]uch an interpretation reaches the extraordinary result of a
constitutional provision being merely auxiliary to some other law, which in the federal system
must be statutory.... The. . .interpretation ... leaves the amendment meaningless . .
74. See note 3 supra.
75. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("person[s] arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to
bail").
76. 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (right to bail not absolute, but when granted bail shall not be
excessive).
77. Compare United States v. Edwards, 29 CRIM. L. RaP. (BNA) 2193 (D.C. Cir. 1981) with
United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cook, 428 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir. 1970); Brown v. United States, 392 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1968) and Trimble v. Stone, 187 F.
Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
78. See United States ex rel. Walker v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States ex rel Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1972); Simon v. Woodson, 454 F.2d
161, 165 (5th Cir. 1972); Bloss v. Michigan, 421 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1970); White v. Wilson, 399
F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968); Sellers v. Georgia, 374 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1967); Mastrian v.
Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710-11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit
Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel Rainwater v. Morris, 411 F. Supp.
1252, 1255 (N.D. II 1976); Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 346 F. Supp. 681, 682 (N.D. Iowa,
1972); United States exrel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Arsad v.
Henry, 317 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Goodine v. Griffin, 309 F. Supp. 590, 591 (S.D. Ga.
1970); Hernandez v. Heyd, 307 F. Supp. 826, 828 (E.D. La. 1970); United States ex rel Fink v.
Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716, 717-18 (E.D. La. 1968), a'd, 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
S95 (1969); Foote, supra note 46, at 1181.
79. 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
80. Id. at 365. "Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law .. , and the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Justice Stevens recently noted adherence to this position.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 149 n.1 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Schilb, Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second
Circuit, stated:
Although this provision of the Bill of Rights has not yet been held by the Supreme Court
to be one of those made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, we
entertain little doubt that it will be.... Likewise we perceive no constitutional distinc-
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In Hunt v. Roth," the Eighth Circuit became one of the first federal
courts to hold explicitly that which the Supreme Court in Schilb only
assumed.82 The court first noted that Duncan v. Louisiana83 requires a
right to be fundamental to the American scheme of justice before it is
incorporated as part of the fourteenth amendment.84 The Eighth Cir-
cuit next looked to Stack for an indication that the right to bail was
fundamental.85 The court then recognized the relationship between the
bail clause and other rights protected by the fourteenth amendment,
such as the presumption of innocence and the sixth amendment right to
counsel.8 6 The court cited with approval both a Fifth Circuit decision
suggesting that bail underlies the entire structure of the Bill of Rights87
and an exposition on the importance of bail from Justice Story's Com-
mentaries on the Constitution. 8 In concluding that the fourteenth
amendment incorporates the excessive bail clause, the court noted that
the Supreme Court had already held another part of the eighth amend-
tion between requiring excessive bail and denying bail altogether in the absence of legiti-
mate reasons.
United States ex rel. Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1972).
81. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-
2165).
82. Id. at 1155. The Third Circuit, just two months before Hunt was handed down, expressly
incorporated the bail clause with a more extensive analysis. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 66-70
(3d Cir. 1981).
83. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
84. 648 F.2d at 1155.
85. Id. In Stack the Supreme Court stressed the importance of bail in allowing the defend-
ant unhampered preparation of his defense and in preventing the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. Id See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 1156. An important distinction exists between an evidentiary and a general pre-
sumption of innocence when considering a bail issue.
"Presumption of innocence" is capable of being used in two different ways. First, it
may be used as an evidentiary rule governing the burden of proof at trial. Second, it
may be used to describe the general presumption that one should not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. Bail functions to preserve the second use.
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). See 9 J. WIGMoPun, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed.
1940). See also Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976).
The Third Circuit, in its analysis of whether bail should be applied to the states, also looked at
other Bill of Rights provisions that have been incorporated. The court noted that the right to a
speedy trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt prevented unwarranted
confinement of persons not yet proven guilty. It suggested that because freedom from excessive
bail serves a similar purpose, logic dictates that bail also be incorporated. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646
F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1981).
87. 648 F.2d at 1156. The court quoted with approval United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d
386 (5th Cir. 1979). "The right to be free from excessive bail underlies the entire structure of the
constitutional rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 393.
88. 648 F.2d at 1156 n.10.
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ment-the cruel and unusual punishment clause-applicable to the
states.89
The Hunt decision properly incorporated the eighth amendment's
bail provision into the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The
holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's previous assumption"
and with the assumption of almost all jurists on the applicability of the
provision to the states.91 In addition, this outcome is further supported
by a similar Third Circuit holding only two months before the Hunt
decision.92
The Eighth Circuit correctly used the test set forth in Duncan to de-
termine whether the bail clause is applicable to the states.93 Although
the court's analysis was short, it relied upon the proper sources: his-
tory94 and similarity to other incorporated rights.9 5 This brevity re-
flected the strength of the assumption that the bail clause does apply to
the states.96
Although there is agreement that bail cannot constitutionally be ex-
cessive,97 there is no such agreement on other aspects of bail. Because
of Afapp,98 rights ancillary to the bail clause are incorporated. 99 These
ancillary rights may have tremendous impact on the amount of flex-
ibility permitted the states in developing and administering their bail
systems. This flexibility is advantageous to bail administration because
the various local laws can reflect community need and sentiment.1°°
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet determined which ancillary
rights should be incorporated within the terms of the fourteenth
amendment.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the present approach to bail has re-
89. Id. at 1156 n.ll.
90. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Friendly, supra note 39,passim; Nowak, supra note 23, at 398 n.15; cases cited in note
78 supra.
92. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1981). See notes 82 & 86 supra.
93. See notes 34-39 supra.
94. For a review of the history of bail, see notes 46-60 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
99. The Supreme Court has used the terms "core" and "ancillary" to describe, respectively,
the specific right mentioned in the constitutional provision and the rights giving meaning and
breadth to the "core" right. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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suited in many proposals for change.'' Preventive detention statutes
are becoming more attractive to persons concerned with the "danger-
ousness" of criminal defendants. 2 Persons concerned that the tradi-
tional form of "cash bail" violates the equal protection doctrine have
suggested alternatives to bail.0 3 Finally, as reflected in Hunt v.
101. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME-FINAL REPORT, PHASE II
. 3S, reprinted in 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3131 (1981).
The Attorney General should support or propose legislation to amend the Bail Reform
Act that would accomplish the following:
a. Permit courts to deny bail to persons who are found by clear and convincing evi-
dence to present a danger to particular persons or the community.
b. Deny bail to an individual accused of a serious crime who had previously, while in a
pretrial release status, committed a serious crime for which he was convicted.
c. Codify existing case law defining the authority of the courts to detain defendants as
to whom no conditions of release are adequate to assure appearance at trial.
d. Abandon, in the case of serious crimes, the current standard presumptively favoring
release of convicted persons awaiting imposition or execution of sentence or appeal-
ing their convictions.
e. Provide the government with the right to appeal release decisions analogous to the
appellate rights now afforded defendants.
f. Require defendants to refrain from criminal activity as a mandatory condition of
release.
g. Make the penalties for bail jumping more closely proportionate to the penalties for
the offense with which the defendant was originally charged.
Id. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 1.1, .4, .5 (Proposed
Official Draft 1971).
102. Nine states presently allow the trial judge to consider the "dangerousness" of the defend-
ant at the pre-trial hearing. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(a) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2105(a) (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 804-1, -7.1 (1976 & Supp. 1978); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:5, :6-a (1979); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 510.30 (1971 & Supp. 1981);
S.C. CODE § 17-15-10 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(a) (1974); VA. CODE § 19.2-120
(Supp. 1979). The District of Columbia enacted a preventive detention statute in 1973. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(3) (1973). See Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1974). See
generally Duke, Bail Reform/or the Eighties: A Reply to Sen. Kennedy, 49 Fo RDI-AM L. REV. 40
(1980); Kennedy, 4 New,4pproach to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and Bail
Reform, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (1980).
103. "Cash bail," a sum of money deposited with the court to assure the accused's presence at
trial, is the traditional form of bail. See Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(4) (1976); Cohen,
Wf'ealth, Bail and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 23 VILL L. REV. 977 (1978). Critics have
questioned cash bail as a denial of equal protection to indigent defendants. Bandy v. United
States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960); Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.
1977). See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 32-33 (1964); Cohen, supra, at
1477.
Because the accused may not have the sum of money required by the court, he may have to turn
to the professional bail bondsman to post the requisite amount in return for a fee. Critics have
also challenged this practice, which is ancillary to cash bail, because it is subject to abuse. It
Allows bail bondsman, and not the court, to hold the key to an individual's freedom. See D.
FREED & P. WALD, supra, at 32-33; Cohen, supra, at 977; Goldkamp, Philadelphia Revisited- An
Examination of Bail and Detention Two Decades after Foote, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 179
(1980); Duker, supra note 36, at 101; Foote, supra note 46, at 1151; Meyer, supra note 46, at 1449.
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Roth,' °4 some state constitutions or statutes may exclude persons ac-
cused of certain crimes from consideration for release on bail.'05
These state-initiated variations in the bail system may be curtailed
by incorporation of the bail clause. As Hunt v. Roth demonstrates, in-
corporation gives the federal courts an additional weapon to strike
down state constitutional or legislative bail provisions. The present
flexibility of our nation's bail laws may thus be eroded.'0 6
Courts may, however, structure incorporation of the bail clause in
such a way as to make possible continued state control over their own
bail laws.'07 For example, a court could distinguish between bailable
and nonbailable offenses on other criteria, such as the gravity of the
offense, rather than the possibility of a death sentence.' A similar
classification occurred to a limited extent in the wake of the Supreme
Court's death penalty decision in Furman.' 9 Such a redefinition of
bailable and nonbailable offenses would not halt the movement toward
See generally Paulsen, Jre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 109, 119-22
(1966).
Jurisdictions dissatisfied with the cash bail method have developed alternative release proce-
dures. An "appearance bond," for instance, allows the accused, at the court's discretion, to post a
sum of money not to exceed 10% of the full amount set by the court, with the entire sum to be
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release, including appearance at trial. See,
eg., Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980); Bail Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(3) (1976). Jurisdictions have also experimented with release on citation of
personal recognizance. See, e.g., Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr.
149 (1980); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 544-545 (1978); D. FREED & P. WALD, supra at 61-63.
104. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1982) (No. 80-
2165).
105. See note 6 supra. This raises the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to bail in
noncapital offenses-an issue that faced the Eighth Circuit in Hunt. Further discussion of this
aspect of Hunt is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment.
106. The Supreme Court has expressed an unwillingness to involve itself in the detail of a
state's bail administration. In Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), in which the bail provision
was assumed applicable to the states, the Court noted that the sole concern presented in that case
was one provision of Illinois' bail laws providing for a one percent cost retention of the bail
amount by the state. That, the Court said, "smacks of administrative detail and of procedure and
is hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right or as based upon any suspect criterion." Id. at
365. But see Friendly, supra note 39, at 929-56.
107. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
108. In Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit reached the same
conclusion. The court speculated that if the rethinking of the purposes of bail continued, courts
might categorize offenses other than capital crimes as nonbailable. The court implicitly acknowl-
edged that before this rethinking could occur, the United States Supreme Court would have to
allow as a permissible goal the protection of the community rather than reasonable assurance of
the accused's presence at trial, the sole justification presently allowed by Stack. Id. at 70.
109. See generaly notes -0-71 supra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/14
BAIL CLAUSE INCORPORATION
preventive detention"' as would a holding that due process requires a
right to bail in noncapital offenses.' 11
If the Supreme Court determines, however, that there is a constitu-
tional right to bail in noncapital cases, any state wishing a particular
crime to be nonbailable will have to make it a capital offense. The
flexibility in determining which crimes are capital is severely curtailed,
though, because the states are limited in prescribing the death penalty
by the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause.' 12
Because of the short-term nature of bail," 3 issues involving bail are
usually rendered moot before reaching the Supreme Court. As a result,
the Court has not yet provided a definitive statement on whether the
bail clause applies to states. With its decision in Hunt, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals became one of the first courts to expressly incor-
porate the bail clause.' 14 Questions concerning the full impact of that
decision, however, remain unanswered.' 5
Despite the Supreme Court's decision to vacate the judgment as
moot, 1 6 Hunt retains its vitality on the merits by establishing the
Eighth Circuit's position on the issue." 7 After Hunt, defendants who
bring an action in the Eighth Circuit for denial of bail under the Ne-
braska provision can expect the court to rule the provision unconstitu-
tional." If the question of whether states are subject to the bail clause
arises again, absent the problem of mootness, the Supreme Court may
expressly incorporate the clause. Perhaps such a determination would
resolve some issues ancillary to incorporation.
KA. M.
110. See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
11I. See notes 66 & 107 supra and accompanying text.
112. In Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972), the
Fourth Circuit determined that the death sentence was "so disproportionate to the crime of rape
when the victim's life is neither taken nor endangered that it violates the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 793.
113. See note 1 supra.
114. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 99-112 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 9 supra.
117. See note I supra.
118. Id.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/14
